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Energy Resources 
and Agriculture 
INTRODUCTION 
The so-called "energy crisis" is a symptom of one of the most fundamental 
and far-reaching changes experienced by our economy in many years. Long-standing 
price relationships have been realligned. Economic relationships between different 
sectors of our economy and between different nations of the world have been 
altered drastically, with resultant political adjustments. Patterns of resource use and 
technology will likely never be the same. The precise nature and extent of the 
coming adjustments is of necessity unknown. 
Agriculture is not immune to these changes, nor to their effects. We may no 
longer rely on our accustomed technology nor on a continued supply of the 
familiar low-cost imputs. The uncertainty which attends the rest of the economy 
as it struggles to deal with adjustments plagues agriculture as well. It is thus 
important that we gather information about the changes and strive to under-
stand the prospects and alternatives before us. 
This publication surveys the history of energy consumption, by sector and by 
source, in the United States; offers a summary of the sources of energy remaining 
and discusses the interpretation of these estimates in the light of projected 
demand, geophysical factors and the impacts of energy use. The special case of 
agriculture is also discussed. 
HISTORICAL TREND OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
The economic history of the United States has been a history of tremendous, 
unprecendented growth in energy consumption. From a total annual non-biologic 
energy consumption of 2.357 quads (quadrillion BTU) in 1850, consumption has 
grown to more than 75 quads in 1973. lOur rate of energy consumption has 
grown so high that we consume a grossly disproportionate share of the world's 
total. With less than six percent of the world's population we consume more than 
one-third of the world's energy.2 The total hides even more ghastly components: 
Representative Morris Udall reports that "Americans consume for air conditioning 
the same amount of power that all 800 million Chinese need for every thing. "3 
Per capita energy consumption has also risen. The index of per capita consump-
tion of all non-biologic energy rose from 80.4 in 1850 to 100 in 1900 and to 231 
in 1965; the index of per capita consumption of mineral fuels and hydro-power 
(but excluding fuel wood and, lately, geothermal and nuclear energy) rose from 
9.4 in 1850 to 100 in 1900, to 281.4 in 1965 and is already above 360.0. 4 
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TABLE I 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN THE U. S. 1850-1973 
A B C D E F G H 
Year Gross GNP Index of Energy Energy Index of per Capita 
Energy (1958 $) Energy Consumption Consumption Energy Consumption 
Consumption Consumption per 1958. per Capita (1900=100) 
(quad. BTU) per Unit of Dollar (thousand 
mineral fuels, mineral fuels, GNP (1900= (million BTU) hydropower, hydropower 100) BTU) fuel wood, 
1850 2.3 80.4 9.4 
V\ 
1855 2.8 81.4 15.5 
1860 3.2 79.6 16.6 
1865 3.4 75.8 18.1 
1870 4.0 78.6 26.6 
1875 4 .3 76.1 32.4 
1880 5.0 56.8 79.0 43.0 
1885 5.6 68.2 79.1 52.6 
1890 7.0 68.6 88.3 71. 7 
1895 7.6 86.9 87.4 77.3 
1900 9.3 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1905 12.8 119.8 125.1 136.3 
1910 16.0 132.2 142.3 161.0 
1915 17.1 134.2 140.2 160.7 
1920 19.8 136.0 186.0 159.4 186.6 
TABLE I CONTINUED 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN THE U. S. 1850-1973 
A B C D E F G H 
1925 20.9 116.3 180.0 153.6 181.1 
1930 22.3 118.0 181. 0 152.8 181. 5 
1935 19.1 105.2 150.0 127.5 150.4 
1940 23.9 99.5 181.0 151. 6 181. 6 
1945 31.5 87.7 238.0 181.5 225.8 
1950 34.0 355.3 91. 5 95.7 223.2 183.9 225.1 
1951 36.8 383.4 96.0 237.6 
1952 36.5 395.1 92.4 231. 7 
1953 37.6 412.8 91.1 234.7 
0. 1954 36.3 407.0 89.2 222.7 
1955 39.7 438.0 87.8 90.6 239.3 196.0 241.6 
1956 41. 7 446.1 93.5 246.9 
1957 41. 7 452.5 92.2 242.4 
1958 41. 7 447.3 93.2 238.4 
1959 43.1 475.9 90.6 242.4 
1960 44.6 487.7 87.8 91.4 246.8 204.9 249.4 
1961 45.3 497.2 91.1 246.5 
1962 47.4 529.8 89.5 254.1 
1963 49.3 551. 0 89.5 260.5 
1964 51.2 581.1 88.1 266.9 
1965 53.3 617.8 81.2 86.3 274.4 231.0 281.4 
1966 56.4 658.1 85.7 287.0 
A B 
1967 58.3 
1968 61. 7 
1969 65.0 
1970 67.4 
1971 69.0 
1972 72.3 
1973 75.6 
-....J Sources: B: 1850-1915: 
1920-1945: 
1950-1973: 
C: 1950-1973: 
D: 1880-1955: 
1960-1972 : 
E: 1950-1973: 
F: 1920-1945: 
1950-1973: 
G: 1850-1955: 
1960-1965: 
H: 1850-1955: 
1960-1965: 
C 
675.2 
706.6 
724.7 
722.5 
745.4 
790.7 
837.3 
TABLE I CONTINUED 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN THE U. S. 1850-1973 
D 
86.2 
84.8 
83.3 
E 
86.3 
87.3 
89.7 
93.3 
92.6 
91.4 
90.2 
F 
293.5 
307.5 
320.8 
329.1 
333.3 
344.9 
358.1 
G H 
U. S. Department of Commerce /76/, computed from total mineral fuels and fuel wood, pp. 354-355. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census /74/, p. 517. 
Committee on Banking and Currency /18/, Table VIII-I, p. 129. 
Committee on Banking and Currency /18/, Table VIII-I, p. 129. 
Schurr /68/, Table 52, p. 158. 
U. S. Bureau of the Census /74/, computed from Table 854, p. 515. 
Committee on Banking and Currency /18/, Table VIII-I, p. 129. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census /74/, p. 517. 
Committee on Banking and Currency /18/, Table 1-3. p. 25. 
Schurr /68/, Table 50, p. 151. 
Darmstadter /21/, computed from Table 2, p. 10. 
Schurr /68/, Table 50, p. 151. 
Darmstadter /21/, computed from Table 2, p. 10. 
A. Industrialization and Mechanization 
This growth is not surprising, for we are familiar with the industrialization, 
mechanization and modernization of the past century. This phenomenon has in-
creased recently: much of the seven percent increase in electrical consumption during 
the last decade has been attributed to the tremendous rise in in the use of such 
appliances as automatic home electric dishwashers (used in 34.3% of the nation's 
electrified homes in 1973 as opposed to 26.5% in 1970 and only 7. 1 % in 1960) 
and room air conditioners (used in 48.9% of the nation's wired homes in 1973, 
40.6% in 1970, and only 15.1% in 1960).5 (See Table II.) 
TABLE II 
HOMES WITH SELECTED ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES: 1952 to 1973 
ITEM 
Air-conditioners, 
room 
Bed coverings 
Dishwashers 
Disposers, food 
waste 
Dryers, clothes 
(incl. gas) 
Freezers, home 
Hotplates and 
buffet ranges 
Irons 
Mixers1 Radios 
Ranges: Free-
Standing 
Built-in 
Refrigerators 
Television: 
Black & White 
Color 
Vacuum Cleaners 
VVashers, Clothes 
NA: Not Available 
1952 
1.3 
8.6 
3.0 
3.3 
3.6 
11. 5 
21. 2 
89.6 
29.7 
96.2 
24.1 
89.2 
46.7 
(x) 
59.4 
76.2 
1960 
(percent) 
15.1 
23.6 
7.1 
10.5 
19.6 
23.4 
24.2 
88.4 
56.0 
94.3 
30.9 
6.4 
98.2 
89.4 
(NA) 
74.3 
85.4 
1965 
24.2 
34.7 
13.5 
13.6 
26.4 
27.2 
22.7 
99.1 
72.8 
99.3 
32.1 
10.3 
99.5 
97.1 
9.5 
83.5 
87.4 
1970 
40.6 
49.5 
26.5 
25.5 
44.6 
31.2 
24.5 
99.7 
82.4 
99.8 
40.5 
15.0 
99.8 
98.7 
42.5 
92.0 
92.1 
x: Not Applicable 
As of December 31. Percentages based on homes wired for electricity. 
1 
Prior to 1970, radio data based on total homes 
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce /76/, Table 1205, p. 705. 
B. Growth of GNP 
1973 
48.9 
53.9 
34.3 
35.3 
53.9 
37.9 
25.1 
99.9 
87.3 
99.9 
46.4 
17.3 
99.9 
99.9 
67.1 
97.5 
97.8 
Another major factor in the growth of the consumption of . energy is growth 
of our economic activity, commonly measured in terms of Gross National Product 
(GNP). In dollar terms, energy constitutes a minor share of GNP: The value of 
8 
primary energy materials consumed (excluding processing and transportation COSts) 
has averaged less than three percent of the dollar value of GNP in this century. 6 
But in a very real sense the record of industrialization is the record of the 
successful harnessing of non-biological sources of energy to perform productive 
activity, which means that the growth in the consumption of energy has been of 
extreme importance in our economy. 
The long-run relationship between the growth of energy consumption and the 
growth in GNP displays a marked pattern. From 1880 to 1955 the ratio of the 
indices of energy consumption to GNP increased by 55%. But the record was not 
one of continuous growth; instead there were three distinct sub-phases. (See Table L) 
The first sub-phase witnessed rapid growth in the ratio: from 1880 to 1910 it 
grew 133%. The decade 1910 to 1920 saw little change in the ratio, although 
great structural change. The third sub-phase, after 1920, was a period during which 
the ratio fell by nearly 33%. The timing of these sub-phases is important: the 
period of most rapid growth in energy use relative to GNP corresponds to the 
period during which coal was the dominant source of energy in the economy. The 
decade of stagnation was the decade when coal's place was first taken by petroleum; 
the third sub-phase has been the time of rapid electrification and widespread growth in consumption of liquid and gaseous fuels, and has also been a time when 
national output has risen relatively faster than labor and capital inputs, as customarily 
measured. 7 Part of the decline in the ratio in recent years is due to the in-
creased share of services (and thus the decreased share of energy-intensive mining and 
manufacturing) in our economy; part is due to improved efficiency in energy use, 
in particular the improved thermal efficiency of large heat-operated electrical 
generating facilities. 
C. Wood, Coal, Oil 
We have already alluded to the changing composltlon of energy consumption 
by sources. In broad strokes it is a story of successive dominance by wood, then 
coal, and now oil and natural gas. 8 In the middle of the nineteenth century, 
wood was the source of 90% of the non-biological energy consumed in the nation; 
as late as 1870 its share was still 75%. But by 1885 coal supplanted wood, with 
negligible production of energy from oil, natural gas or hydro-power. The share of 
coal reached a peak of 76.8% in 1910; it had risen until then entirely at the expense 
of the share of wood. The consumption of oil began to grow noticeably about 
1890; it was the rapid growth in use of oil and natural gas after 1910 that was 
responsible (along with a slight absolute decline) for the fall in coal's share. 
By 1950 .the share of oil and natural gas had exceeded 50%; coal's share had 
fallen below 40%.9 The process is continuing: by 1960 the share of oil and gas 
was three times that of coal, and in 1970 it was greater by a factor of 3.5. 10 
Hydro-power has accounted for between three and four percent of the total 
energy consumption during most of the twentieth century . The share of solar 
power and atomic fission are still negligible; that of fusion is zero. Many people 
claim that one or more of these sources represent our best hope for the future. 
This issue will be discussed later. 
Figure 1 shows the energy flow in the United States during 1970. The 
sources of energy which we have been discussing, and their relative weights, are 
shown on the left, feeding into the system. The energy flow diagram also 
enables us to examine the composition of total energy consumption by consuming 
sector. Customary practices are not entirely convenient for our purposes, since the 
sectors for which most information is published are industry, transportation, 
residential/commercial, and utilities. Agriculture is usually not afforded the dignity 
9 
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Figure 1: U. S. Energy Flow, 1970 
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of a separate category, and it is a tedious (and risky) procedure to patch rogether 
estimates by adding farm machinery, food transport , agricultural electrical use, 
and a myriad of other individual items. Some people have performed this chore, 
however. 
D. Sectoral Consumption Patterns 
According to the standard classification, transportation consumed more than one-
fifth of the total energy used in the United State in 1970: 16.2 quads. l1 
Petroleum provided nearly all the energy consumed in this sector; automobiles 
consumed 55% (or one-eighth of total national energy consumption), trucks con-
sumed 21 %, and aircraft 7. 5 %. The remainder was consumed by railways, bus, 
water craft, pipelines, etc. 12 Thus, much of the consumption of energy in trans-
portation is a result of our people's desire for convenience (automobile) and speed 
(air and automobile); the share of the more efficient (but slower and usually less 
convenient) means of transportation, primarily rail, pipeline, and water, is low. One 
can see from the far right of the energy flow diagram that less than one quarter 
of the energy input into the transportation sector is converted into useful energy. 13 
The residential and commercial sectors consumed 22.2% of the total national 
1970 energy consumption: 15.8 quads. Space heating and cooling, water heating, 
refrigeration and cooking represent more than 75% of the commercial energy use and 
more than 85% of the residential use. 14 
Industry's share is presently the largest: 29.3%. More than half of industrial 
consumption of energy takes place in the primary metals industries, chemicals, 
petroleum and related industries. Natural gas was the most widely used source of 
energy (46 .8%) and was the fastest growing; coal was second with 25.3%, 
followed by oil (16.3%) and electricity 01.9%). The major industries have for 
some years enjoyed a decline in input per unit of output, but output has of course 
grown so much that total energy consumption in industry has risen. 
Electric utilities are the most rapidly growing consumer of primary energy 
sources. Their share in 1970 was 12.0%; their share in 1971 was 25%. It 
would have been much higher still were it not for the tremendous increases in 
efficiency in the industry. 15 
Table III presents a detailed breakdown of the use of the various energy sources 
in each of the four sectors. Table IV presents a detailed breakdown of final use in 
each sector. When agriculture's share is carved out from these four, it is obvious 
that agriculture is not a relatively large consumer of energy in our economy. From 
data provided by the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, one researcher16 computed 1968 energy consumption of "production agriculture 
and the input industries (fertilizer, pesticides, farm machinery, etc.)" to be two 
quads . This compares with the consumption in the chemical industry (less the 
chemicals used in agriculture) of more than five quads, in steel (less steel used in 
agriculture) of almost four quads, and in transportation of more than fifteen quads. 
Thus, agriculture's share is a little more than three percent. 
This figure is consistent with the estimates of others, and is also consistent 
with the share of agriculture in the consumption of individual energy sources. In 
1969 2.6 million farms consumed six billion gallons of petroleum, three percent of 
the nation's petroleum consumption. 17 (Corresponding shares were 4% in 1950, and 
3% in 1939 with 1.6 billion gallons .) Similarly, in 1971 agriculture consumed 
40 billion kilowatts of electricity, 2.7% of the nation's total use. IS 
We shall discuss energy and agriculture in more detail later. But first, we 
continue our broad survey of our energy situation , examining next our remaining 
sources of energy. 
11 
Fuel 
oil 
natural 
gas 
coal 
hydro.,.. 
power 
nuclear 
TABLE III 
U. S. ENERGY USE BREAKDOWN BY SECTOR, 1970 
(percent) 
Sector: 
Residential and Electric 
Transportation Commercial Utility 
96.3 43.5 12.0 
3.7 54.0 27.0 
2.5 54.0 
5.0 
2.0 
Source: Adapted from Maryland /48/, p. 20. 
TABLE IV 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ENERGY END USE 
SECTORS IN THE U. S., 1970 
(percent) 
Transportation 
Automobiles 
Trucks & Buses 
Aircraft 
Agriculture 
Ships & Boats 
Railroads 
Residential and Commercial 
Space Heating 
Water Heating 
Air Conditioning 
Refrigeration 
Lighting 
Cooking 
Clothes Drying & Other 
Jndustrial 
Process Steam 
Direct Heat 
Electric Drive 
Electrolytic Process 
Totals may not add to 100 percent due to rounding. 
Source: Adapted from Maryland /48/, p. 22. 
12 
53.5 
21. 7 
12.7 
4.9 
4.1 
3.1 
56.0 
12.3 
7.8 
6.8 
4.7 
4.0 
9.0 
44.8 
30.8 
21.2 
3.2 
Industrial 
29.0 
49.0 
22.0 
SOURCES OF ENERGY 
A. Introduction 
In the context of our rapidly growing demand for energy it is of interest 
and important to monitor our remaining sources of energy. This knowledge can 
inform the short-run stewardship of our fossil fuel resources and our concurrent 
search for and development of al ternative sources of energy. 
In this part, then , we undertake to gather information about what remains of 
the physical substances and natural forces we use to qbtain our energy, how much 
we can hope to obtain for use under given conditions, constraints on the use of 
these substances and forces, and opportunity costs incurred by their use to provide 
energy. 
Section B, Intellectural Framework, contains technical discussions of such 
matters as types of energy sources; definitions of reserves, resources and resource 
base; technology and substitution. Section C presents a Summary of Supply of 
energy. Section D, The Impact of Energy Use, contains a discussion of the environ-
mental, political and socio-economic impact of energy use. Then Section E, Demand, 
discusses of projected U.S. and world demand for these energy sources. 
B. Intellectual Framework 
It is helpful to classify all energy sources as members of four groups: 
(a) fixed, finite, depletable; 
(b) fixed, finite, conservable; 
(c) in continuous flow to earth; 
(d) fixed, finite, ?19 
By far the majority of energy sources with which we are familiar, and of the 
energy which we use, belongs to the first group. By 1970 fossil fuels were the 
source of more than 98% of the total non-biological energy consumed by the 
United States. 20 All of the fossil fuels, coal, oil, natural gas and natural gas 
liquids, were formed by the action of heat and pressure below the earth's surface, 
acting on organic matter, in a process which lasted as long as 500 million 
years. A finite amount of these substances was formed; the relevant time horizon for 
our purposes is sufficiently shorter than 500 million years that we may consider 
the total physical incidence fixed. When these substances are used (burned) to pro-
duce energy, "the energy content, after various degradations during use, degenerates 
to unusable heat at the lowest ambient temperature, and then leaves the earth 
as long-wavelength radiation. The material content is reduced to common inorganic 
chemicals such as H20 and C02, and a residue of mineral ash. "21 Thus these 
substances, fossil fuels, having been in initial fixed, finite supply, are depletable. 
The other significant energy source in our economy, water power, can be 
classified in the second group. There are a limited number of streams which are 
suitable as energy sources, but as long as the water cycle continues (as long as 
the sun shines, abstracting from scattered, occasional droughts) the exploitation 
of this energy source today will not diminish its potential for exploitation tomorrow. 22 
A potentially important source of energy in the future23 is the sun. Solar 
energy is the primary constituent of the third group, as there is a continuous 
flow of solar energy to the earth. At present our use of the tremendous amounts 
of solar energy reaching our planet is extremely inefficient, but technological 
advances are possible. 
13 
The source of the sun's energy, nuclear fusion, constitutes along with its 
first cousin, atomic fission, the fourth group. The materials from which this energy 
can be obtained on earth, certain isotopes of hydrogen for fusion, isotopes of 
uranium, plutonium, thorium, and other elements for fission, occur in finite 
quantities, but in some cases a by-product of an energy-producing reaction in a so-
called breeder reactor converts a quantity of a non-usable isotope of an element 
into a usuable isotope. 24 Commercial breeder reactors are being constructed in the 
United Kingdom. None will be operational in this country before 1980, and recent 
criticisms of their safety may delay their operation. Standard (or "burner") fission 
reactors are already producing power all over the world. Thermonuclear fusion 
has not yet been controlled but some believe it to be the only long-run hope. 25 
Of these energy sources, the ones about which most scarcity reports have been 
issued are natural gas, and gasoline and other fractional distillates of oil. Stocks 
of gasoline in mid-June decreased by two million barrels, down 25 million 
barrels below the stocks held during the previous June; there have been predictions 
of sharply rising prices and "shortages" of gasoline at retail in many parts of the 
nation later this summer and on into winter, even under the best of circum-
stances. 26 Of course a "shortage" depends on given levels of costs and tech-
nology on the supply side and of other prices on the demand side. Change any 
element of this matrix, and the computed "shortage" will be different. 27 
This much is familiar and comfortable to all economists. But few economists 
discuss (nor is neoclassical micro-economic theory well prepared to handle) the 
special case of depletable or exhaustible resources: when and if physical depletion 
occurs the supply curve will be a vertical line coincident with the ordinate. 28 
This is not yet the case: as we shall see, large quantities remain of all of 
our fuels, both in this country and abroad. But much confusion surrounds the 
specification and measurement of what is "available," even given a precise matrix of 
prices and a set of techniques. Some of the confusion may be international: it 
is possible that a firm would consider it to be in its own interest to foment 
some kinds of uncertainty among ' its competitors and even its customers. But much 
of the confusion, and contradictory estimates, seem based simply on imprecise 
and conflicting uses of crucial concepts. 
The terms "reserves" and "resources", as they are customarily used, refer to 
the natural occurrences of useful mineral substances in the earth's crust. But there 
are three shortcomings to the normal usage. First, seldom is there consideration 
of the economic aspect; or, in the terms used above, seldom is there specification 
of the price matrix underlying the estimate. Second, there is usually no way of 
distinguishing the known and unknown parts of the estimated reserves or resources; 
we feel sure that there is lots of it down there that we have not yet come across, 
and often some of the postulated-but-not-yet-discovered gets included with the known 
and confirmed in the published estimates, with no clear guidance how to sort them 
out. And finally, there is seldom any provision for future technical progress which 
might render certain deposits accessible (given the price matrix), or if technological 
progess is assumed in the estimates the exact assumptions are seldom explicitly 
specified. 
Sam Schurr and his associates at Resources for the Future, noting these 
shortcomings of the common usage, propose three concepts which offer hope of 
great clarification. 29 In order from most restrictive to most inclusive, the three 
concepts are reserves, resources and resource base. As they define the terms,30 
14 
"Reserves are the stocks of a mineral raw material in situ as viewed by the 
operator producing it. They are explicitly defined in terms of immediate or 
short-term economic feasibility of extraction. The cost limits are consistent 
with normal risk taking and commercial production, and exclude material known 
to exist but which cannot be profitably extracted with current techniques." 
"Resource Base is conceived to include the sum total of a mineral raw material 
present in the earth's crust within a given geographic area." 
"Resources consist of that part of the resource base (including reserves) which 
seems likely to become available given certain technologic and economic con-
ditions." 
Much of the confusion among published estimates of energy resources stems 
from two obvious features of resources as here defined. First, the stock of resources 
includes some unknown, or as-yet-undiscovered quantity of the substance. It is 
tautological but important to remember that one cannot precisely know the unknown. 
Second, and more crucial, any estimate of the existing resources of some sub-
stance, in the sense used here and in the only sense that is meaningful, must 
include (because it is based on) some specified price matrix. And since all future 
projections for the elements of the relevant price matrix are guesses, however 
well or poorly educated, and will likely differ from estimator to estimator, it is 
not at all surprising to notice the wide diversity among published resource 
estimates. 
A further source of confusion which is not immediately apparent from the 
discussion is the reticence of many producing firms about their reserves, which are 
their working inventories. 31 To confirm the existence of oil, for example, requires 
drilling a well. This is expensive, and a company may have tax, competitive or 
other reasons for not attempting to confirm all its supposed deposits or even 
announce all its confirmed discoveries. Perhaps the firm will drill only when it needs 
to find new sources for immediate production, in full confidence that the substance 
is there, keeping "reserves" at an artificially low level. 
The lessons of this exercise in lexicography are two. One is to suggest why 
the numbers we find diverge so widely; and, concurrently, to instill a sense of 
caution in their use. The other is to sharpen our sense of the wide divergence 
between the geologically existent and the recoverable, between the resource base 
and the ultimate resources, given the (now unknown but hypothetically specified) 
technology (including the use of energy to obtain energy) and the prices which will 
obtain in the future. 
Again we repeat: there is an upper limit to the resources somewhere. It may 
be the resource base, but it is likely much lower than that. 
A number of caveats are necessary in order to deal with published reserve 
and resource figures. The first has to do with recovery of useful substances from re-
serves: both the amount and the rate of recovery from a given field are limited. 
Given our present technology, no more than 80% of the natural gas in a 
field, and no more than 35% of the oil in a field, can be brought to the surface 
economically. No more than a quarter of the known coal is in seams which are 
both thick enough and sufficiently close to the surface to be considered recoverable. 32 
Increased prices could make it economic to recover a large proportion of these fuels 
in the future, for example by pumping water into oil fields to increase the pres-
sure or by extending coal mines even deeper into the crust of the earth. But there 
will come a time, even after price increases and technological advances, when it will 
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require more energy to obtain the fuels than they would provide. What is left will 
remain in the ground. 
Similarly, there is a limit to the rate at which the substances can be 
recovered. With regard to oil and natural gas, the limiting rate is the result of 
geophysical properties of the substances and the rock formations in which they are 
trapped. 
Some geologists point with concern to the declining ratio of reserves to annual 
production, or Rip. In recent years the petroleum and natural gas industry has 
been closing down wells about as fast as new discoveries. Thus, with increasing 
domestic demand the RIP ratio has declined from 30: 1 in 1950 to 9: 1 in 1973. The 
petroleum industry considers a RIP ratio of 12: 1 a rock bottom minimum. Risser 
estimated that to maintain levels of production new additions to recoverable oil 
and gas reserves must be 20 percent and 27 percent, respectively, above the 1956-70 
rate of discoveries. 33 In fact, "finding rates" have fallen sharply since the 1930's 
when discoveries produced about 276 barrels of new crude per foot of exploratory 
drilling to 35 barrels per foot in 1965 and 30 in 1972. 
The issue of the rate of recovery can also be posed in regard to atomic 
energy, where one constraint on the rapid immediate expansion of fission-powered 
electric generators is the need to save enough of the relatively scarce U-235 until 
the breeder reactor is more fully developed and widely distributed, to ensure 
enough enriched uranium to fire these fuel-producing devices. 
In addition to this caveat about the amount and the rate of recovery , there are 
two further issues to be mentioned. The first is another reminder that the physical 
incidence of fuel substances in the ground (or of various natural forces operating 
around us) is not everything. Also of crucial importance are the processing, 
distribution and use of these substances. And it is in these areas where much of 
our present difficulties originate. 
For example, daily U.S. consumption in 1973 of fractional distillates of oil was 
about 18 million barrels, but total U.S. refinery capacity was estimated at less than 
14 million barrels per day. 34 Similar difficulties affect the distribution of energy. 
Electricity requires massive networks of transmission lines and transformers, and finds 
the prime materials for this equipment (silver, copper, and energy-intensive 
aluminum) increasingly scarce. And coal is competing with grain for new railroad 
cars in which to move from the mines to factOries and generators. In all aspects 
of energy use, to maintain continued rates of consumption and to meet projected 
increases in demand will require massive capital investment, to finance research, 
exploration, extraction, processing, distribution and use. The cOStS of many of these 
activities are increasing. 35 
The last issue for now is that aggregate energy supply figures are not sufficient: 
the nature of projected substitutions of one energy source for another is important. 
While we can blithely proclaim the equivalence of a barrel of oil and a quarter ton 
of coal, any motorist who would try to operate his V-8 on coal dust would 
discover that the real story is somewhat more complicated. Heat equivalency hides 
significant differences in suitability for various tasks. This issue bears particularly 
on energy use in agriculture, as we shall see in the last part. 
Substitutions will of necessity require large capital expenditures, as production 
and distribution of one source must rapidly expand. Little of the capital that 
would be idled by a substitution would likely be suitable for any other purpose. 
Further, many substitutions would be constrained by such factors as the excessive 
sulphur content of much of the nation's remaining coal or the heat and waste · 
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problems of atomic reactors or the inferior flexibility of fixed-location electrical 
equipment. The supplies of each of the individual energy sources is thus important. 
C. Summary of Supply 
Estimates of our remaining fuel sources vary rather widely; estimates of 
probable future discoveries of useful, recoverable deposits vary even more. It is the 
purpose of this section to summarize the more likely estimates for each of our fuel 
sources, . leaving to other sources the task of examining the estimates in detail. 36 
In Tables V, VI and VII we can get an idea of the range of different 
estimates, these from David Rose, Mobil Oil Corporation and the Geological 
Survey. Note that Mobil Oil presents consistently lower estimates than the others; 
note the particularly large differences in the estimates for shale oil and uranium. These 
wide differences are not surprising, for these are two sources for which the 
technologies are least well developed and therefore for which greater uncertainty 
(and a wider range of estimates) exists about the technology elements of the 
relevant price-technology matrix. 
TABLE V 
ROSE'S ESTIMATES OF VARIOUS ENERGY SOURCES, U. S. 
Resource 1 Reserve 
Source Amount Energy Content Amount Energy Content 
(quad. Btu) (quad. Btu.) 
Coal 1600 bil. tons 40,000 150 bil. tons 3,750 
Oil 36 bil. BBL 201. 6 
Shale oil 1600 bil. BBL 9,280 55 bil. BBL 319 
Uranium 25,000 tons 1,500 8,166 tons 500 
Source: Rose /63/, pp. 24, 25 and Theobald et. al. /72/. 
1 Conversion factors used: 
coal: 25,000,000 BTU/ton 
oil: 5,600,000 Btu/barrel 
shale oil: 5,800,000 Btu/barrel 
uranium: 60 trillion Btu/ton. This assumes breeder technology 
is perfected. 
The Demand Reference figures from Table VI suggest that, relative to current 
consumption rates of our energy sources, remaining U.S. resources37 are large only 
for coal at present levels of knowledge. Resources are potentially large for uranium 
and shale oil, bue the remaining U.S. resources of oil and natural gas are small 
relative to current rates of consumption. 
It is well-known38 that imports of oil and natural gas into the United 
States have grown rapidly in recent years, and are expected to increase still further 
if political and financial problems do not persist. (See Figure 2.) For oil, more 
than for any other energy source, the situation of world reserves is of importance 
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TABLE VI 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY ESTIMATES OF VARIOUS ENERGY SOURCES, U. S. 
Source 
Coa!l 
\ 
Oil 
Natural gas 
Shale oil 
Uranium 
Resources Remaining Energy Content 
(quad. Btu.) 
1. 5 tril. tons 37,500.0 
250 bi!. BBL 1,400.0 
1 quad. cubic feet 1,032.0 
160 bil. BBL to 928. O2 600 bil. BBL 3,480.0 
3 450, 000 tons 225.04 27,000.0 
Demand Reference1 
(years) 
500 
50 
43 
35 
131 
13 
1,560 
Source: Adapted from U. S. Geological Survey, using "low" estimates, /45/. 
See also Table VII. 
1Demand Reference is the quotient of an energy source and the current 
rate of consumption of that source. Recall our caveat above about assuming 
the technological feasibility of producing a constant amount until depletion. 
These figures are only for reference; they do not indicate consumption 
possibilities. 
2"Recoverable only if crude prices rise 150%." The price of crude oil 
has risen much more than 150% since January, 1973. But the equipment 
necessary to extract and process shale oil is highly energy-intensive and it is 
not clear that crude oil prices have risen a full 150% relative to the costs of 
this equipment, the skilled labor to operate it, and the water necessary to the 
operation. 
3Energy obtainable from Uranium "with present technology". 
4Total energy contained in Uranium. 
to the United States. In Table VIII are summarized David Rose's estimates of 
world proved reserves of oil. 
Much attention has been focused on the Middle East by recent political 
events and the temporary suspension of oil exports from that region. The gravity 
of a permanent embargo is suggested by the fact that nearly 47% of the world's 
proved reserves of oil, according to Rose's figures, lie in the Middle East; the 
United States contains only one-tenth that amount, just over 4.7%. Some estimators, 
notabl y the National Petroleum Council, an association of U. S. oil producers, 
expect to discover at least as much oil off the coast~of the United States as is 
known to exist in the Middle East,39 but such hopes are speculative, have yet to 
be confirmed, and seem unlikely. 40 
D. The Impact of Energy Use 
Three types of impact are of interest to us: environmental, political, and 
socio-economic. The production of energy from any source for any purpose has 
environmental impact under the best conditions; it is claimed by many that 
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Alaska 
Lower 48 states 
Subtotal onshore 
Atlantic 
Alaska 
Gulf of Mexico 
Pacific Coast 
Subtotal offshore 
Total United States 
TABLE vn 
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION AND U. S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
ESTIMATES OF U. S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
Undiscovered recoverable Undiscovered recoverable 
oil & natural gas liquids natural gas 
(billions of barrels) {trillions of cubic feet} 
Mobil USGS Mobil USGS 
expected expected 
value Low High value Low 
Onshore 
21 25 50 104 105 
13 110 220 65 500 
34 135 270 169 605 
Offshore 
6 10 20 31 55 
20 30 60 105 170 
14 20 40 69 160 
14 5 10 69 10 
54 64 130 274 395 
88 200 400 443 1000 
High 
210 
1000 
1210 
110 
340 
320 
20 
790 
2000 
Mobil estimates include water depths to 6000 feet, whereas USGS now stops at 660 feet. Mobil's numbers represent the median 
value of a probability distribution. For instance, there is a 90 percent chance that total U. S. oil is greater than 50 billion barrels 
and less than 150 billion; the expected value is 88 billion. 
Source: Gillette /28/, p. 128. 
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TABLE VIII 
ROSE' S ESTIMATES OF WORLD PROVED RESERVES OF OIL 
Area and Cotll1try Amount 
1 
Energy Content 2 
(bil. BBL) (quad. Btu.) 
Middle East 352 1971.2 
Saudi Arabia 139 778.4 
Kuwait 75 420.0 
Iran 60 336.0 
Iraq 33 184.8 
Abu Dhabi 18 100.8 
Other 25 140.0 
Communist 57 319.2 
USSR 42 235.2 
China 13 72.8 
Other 2 11.2 
Africa 53 296.8 
Libya 24 134.4 
Nigeria 13 72.8 
Algeria 10 56.0 
Other 6 33.6 
North America 47 263.2 
United States 36 201. 6 
Canada 8 44.8 
Mexico 3 16.8 
South America 27 151.2 
Venezuela 14 78.4 
Ecuador 6 33.6 
Other 7 39.2 
Southeast Asia 16 89.6 
Indonesia 10 56.0 
Other 6 33.6 
Western Europe 10 56.0 
Source: Rose /63/, p. 25. 
1 Totals may not add because of rounding. 
2Conversion factor: 5,600,000 Btu/barrel. 
as energy is currently produced and consumed it is one of the major sources of 
environmental deterioration in this country. 41 Pollution from fossil fuels includes 
sulphur emissions from coal and natural gas, lead and carbon monoxide from 
gasoline, heat flow into the atmosphere and bodies of water, and high levels of 
carbon dioxide emission. 42 The last may become the most serious; analysis has 
shown that "the C02 content of the atmosphere since 1900 has increased 10%. 
Since C02 absorbs long-wavelength radiation , it is possible that this is already 
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producing a secular climatic change in the direction of higher average tempera-
tures. "43 The release of energy by atomic reaction is free of the release of 
mineral pollutants or ash, but is typically subject to even greater release of heat and 
is subject to the further twin problems of radiation leakage during the reaction 
and the storage or disposal of the radioactive wastes. There have been recent 
allegations that the current safety practices are inadequate in the nation's reactors and 
storage facilities. 44 The potential for disaster is harrowing: heavy doses of radiation, 
if not fatal, can cause transmittable genetic damage, and plutonium is one of 
the most highly carcinogenic substances known. 
The real problem is one of trade-offs where trades may be dear: to reduce 
particulate pollution requires the use ofless prevalent "cleaner" fuel or the use of more 
energy te> remove the particulates from the exhaust system (of an automobile, 
an electric generating facility, or whatever).45 Burning some fuels at lower tempera-
tures will reduce emissions of oxides of nitrogen, a particularly harmful pollutant, 
but also will reduce the efficiency of the energy conversion by a significant 
amount. 46 And to forbear the use of plutonium in atomic reactors because of the 
health danger would be to limit drastically the potential for power generation from 
fission. The Council on Environmental Quality has recently assured the nation that 
such trade-offs can be made and that the nation can meet its massive energy 
demands without despoiling the environment, but concedes that this will require an 
(unspecified) increase in prices and suggests that it might also depend on some 
technological advances. 47 
Our current energy regime has complex and far-ranging political impact. 
World politics is intimately involved with issues of oil importation, as the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries seeks monopoly power, as many domestic 
politicians and businessmen call for self-sufficiency in energy to ipsure national 
security, and as the share of oil obtained abroad increases beyond prediction. 48 
Some domestic energy companies enjoy certain tax advantages, such as the oil 
depletion allowance, which still enjoy political support (witness their continued 
existence) and for which the companies would no doubt try to exercise whatever 
political influence is at their disposal. And many energy firms enjoy monopoly 
status as regulated public utilities in an environment where technology, economics 
and politics are closely mixed together. 
The current energy regime also has complex socio-economic impact. Any changes 
in the regime are certain to have differential impact on the various groups of 
energy consumers. For example, drastic price increases (while possibly inducing an 
expansion of productive capacity) will yield a huge windfall bonus to producers 
currently exploiting an energy source. This bonus, a transfer from consumers, would 
represent a dead-weight welfare loss. A drastic price increase might also find energy 
waste more expensive. The current level of wasteage is appalling: automobiles 
expel as much as 87% of their energy intake out the exhaust pipe as waste heat, 
and a pilot light on a gas range typically consumes more than half of the 
appliance's total fuel consumption, all for the sake of convenience. It has been 
estimated that American consumers "waste" as much as half of all the energy they 
burn, in this and other ways, relative to the technologically most efficient known 
practices. 49 For a final example of socio-economic impact of energy regimes, if the 
share of energy from petroleum fell, due perhaps to a rapid development of energy 
generation from fission and/or solar power, then necessarily the share of energy 
generated at a fixed or central location (typically an electric generating station) would 
increase and energy use patterns would need to change. Such a change would have 
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a strong impact on agriculture, in which much of the energy used is consumed 
in small, movable, self-contained engines as on tractors and other motorized 
machinery, or in grain dryers. The problem of distribution would shift from the 
transport of petroleum to the transmission of electricity throughout the countryside. 
E. Demand 
We have surveyed the broad history of U.S. energy use and summarized 
estimates of remaining supplies of fuels and their likely future availability. We 
then briefly considered the various impacts of energy use. We must now complement 
those discussions by examining likely future demand for energy sources. The special 
case of agriculture and energy's place therein will be discussed. 
Two dimensions of demand are important. The first is the demand for these 
substances (primarily fossil fuels) either as a source of power or for alternative 
uses. The second is United States demand or world demand. Several detailed 
projections have been made for energy demand in the United States and in the entire 
world; these we shall report. Fewer specific projections have been made for the 
demand for these substances for alternative purposes, but we can suggest the 
nature of the problem. 
The problem of forecasting is always tricky, and especially so in this case. 
The more rapid and fundamental have been recent structural changes and the longer 
the necessary time horizon, the greater the difficulty. Forecasting energy demand 
suffers both of those difficulties: complex changes in the patterns of energy inputs 
coupled with very long lead times for processing, conversion and distribution 
facilities have prevented the emergence of a dependable "normal" pattern. The 
primary method used to project future demand has been to extrapolate past 
trends (for example, energy consumption per capita or per unit of GNP, or rate 
of change of energy consumption per unit of GNP or per unit of time), which 
are so undependable. Some scholars5o disaggregate energy consumption by sector hoping 
thereby to achieve more reliable estimates, but the effort seems l~rgely futile. 
One particular structural change which has been important in the last few 
months is huge price increases for fossil fuels. The importance of the increases is 
the secondary structural changes they have caused and can be expected to continue to 
cause. More expensive energy has caused many firms and households (including farms 
in both categories) to reduce wasteage, by installing better insulation in buildings, 
for instance, or by recycling a number of substances. And the rising price of 
energy has made it economical now to introduce energy efficient equipment 
and processes. As these changes continue, we can expect to see per capita and 
per-GNP demand for energy decrease. 
We noted the decline since 1920 of the ratio of energy use to GNP. But 
movements have been unstable: that decline hides a decline of 0.7 percent per 
year from 1947 to 1966 but an increase of 2.4 percent per year since 1966 with 
further increases in question. 51 It is difficult to estimate the quantitative 
impact of changes such as these. The elasticity of demand for electricity in 
residential use has been estimated to be 1. 252 but this is a partial elasticity 
allowing substitutions by other energy sources, and tells us little about what the 
elasticity of demand for aggregate energy might be. 
We cannot expect aggregate consumption of energy to decline, though. Both 
GNP and population are growing in this country at rates high enough to support 
growing energy consumption even if energy use per capita or per unit of GNP were 
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to decline. And United Nations figures suggest even more dramatic growth in 
energy demand per capita in the rest of the world , where population growth 
rates are also much higher. (See Table IX.) 
TABLE IX 
PERCENTAGE INCREASES IN POPULATION AND ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA BETWEEN 1950 and 1970 
% Population % Per capita energy 
Increase consumption increase 
World 46 57 
Africa 59 73 
N. America 38 43 
S. America 75 122 
Asia 52 197 
Europe 18 96 
Oceana 54 54 
Source: United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1953 and 1971. 
The high rates of increase in energy consumption per capita in South America 
and in Asia are increases from a very low base of consumption by rapidly 
expanding populations. As the peoples of those nations strive to continue their 
economic development they will demand further massive increases in energy con-
sumption. That is a growth of demand that cannot be suppressed , physically, 
politically, or morally. Rapid population growth, the desire to narrow the gap be-
tween the U.S. level of living a9d that of the developing nations, and the con-
tinuing progress of the non-developed economies will insure strong and growing 
demand for energy. 
A number of groups have published estimates of total United States energy 
demand during the next three decades or less. Department of the Interior 
projections of U.S. energy demand by consuming sectOr and by source for the years 
1975, 1980, 1985 and 2000, as well as actual energy consumption in 1971, are 
displayed in Table X . It is obvious that the demand for energy is not expected 
to decline; indeed, projected demand in the year 2000 is nearly triple the level 
of energy consumption in 1970. The sector for which projected growth in demand will 
be greatest is the electric utility sector; this involves substitution toward nuclear, 
solar, geothermal and coal-based generation. The sectOr for which projected growth 
in demand is smallest is the residential and commercial sector. Table X shows large 
increases in energy demanded from nuclear sources, largely at the expense of energy 
demanded from natural gas. It is difficult to evaluate estimates of future supply 
and demand because each estimate depends on a particular matrix of relative 
prices. But it is clear that even if allowances are made to adjust the implicit 
underlying price matrices, projected demand for certain fuels exceeds anticipated 
physical availability. 
For example, to meet the projected demand for natural gas5 3 throughout this 
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decade would require the confirmation of another 456 trillion cubic feet of reserves, 
or an average of 45.6 trillion cubic feet per year. Yet the rate of confirmaion 
has been declining from a maximum annual rate of only 24.7 trillion cubic feet. The 
situation is similar for oil: without imports or Alaskan oil the projected demand 
during this decade would require new discoveries at double the rate of the past 
fifteen years; with Alaskan oil domestic supplies would still be insufficient. 54 Of 
course prices could rise much more than the projections had anticipated, thus 
dampening future demand and possible eliciting greater exploration, discovery and 
supply. But beyond some point even further price rises will do little to increase 
supply. 
And the rate of growth of demand for the entire world, as suggested above, 
is likely to be even higher than the U.S. rate of growth, more than tripling 
by 2000. (See Table XI.) The National Petroleum Council55 predicts that more than 
60% of the oil and 30% of the natural gas consumed in the United States in 
1985 will (have to) be imported, but such relief from foreign sources for our 
energy shortages will be made much more difficult then by the increased foreign 
demand. 
Real demand is even higher than this would indicate, for these figures refer 
to the use of these substances only as sources of energy. But there are important 
alternative uses which are of potentially much greater importance. 
Only certain grades of coal are suitable to make coke, an essential ingredient 
in the smelting of steel. Unfortunately, those grades are also, in part because of low 
sulphur content, the most desirable for generating power. They have also been 
among the most easily recoverable deposits. Thus coal of these grades is quickly 
being burned in power plants, never to be replaced. 
Much of our phenomenally high level of living can be attributed to our 
extremely high rate of consumption of plastics, pharmaceuticals, chemical fertilizers 
and other petro-chemical products. Most of these items are obtained as regular by-
products of the refining process which also yields gasoline, lubricants, and heating 
oil. But there do exist wide opportunities for transformation in production, so 
that the output of one distillate from a given amount of crude oil can be increased 
somewhat, at the expense of the output of one or more of the other distillates. 
So it does make sense to say that our automobiles or furnaces or ovens are 
burning up medicines or the nitrogen fertilizer that could increase food production. 
This issue of alternative uses for energy sources is a special substitution issue. 
But since there are often more possible substitutes for these substances as energy 
sources than as chemical feedstocks, an exercise ,evaluating their optimal rate of 
depletion (given estimates of the date of appearance of adequate energy substitutes 
and the relative importance of their use as chemical feedstocks) would be valuable . 
Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper, however. 56 
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TABLE X 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SOURCES AND SECTORS, 1971-2000. 
Total Total Total 
Total Gross Synthetic Four Utility Three 
c b Natural Fossil Nuclear Hydro Energy Gas Sector Electric Sector 
Coala Petroleum Gas Fuels Power Power Inputs Distributed Inputs Distributed Inputs 
1971 Household & Commercial 390 6,545 7,346 14,281 14,281 14,281 3,160 17,441 
Industrial .••••.. 4,465 5,391 10,438 20,294 20,294 20,294 2,329 22,623 
Transportation .•••• 7 16,139 825 16,971 16,971 16,971 18 16,989 
Electrical Generation. 7,698 2,417 4,125 14,240 405 2,798 17,443 17,443 (5,507) 
Synthetic Gas .•••• 
Total · ..... • 12,560 30,492 22,734 65 , 786 405 2,798 68,989 
1975 Household & Commercial 325 6,950 8,660 15,935 15,935 15,935 4,240 20,175 
Industrial • • • • • • • 4,600 6,510 11,740 22,850 22,850 22,850 3,010 25,860 
N Transportation 18,050 1,020 19,070 19,070 19,070 20 19,090 0\ .... 
Electrical Generation . 8,900 3,580 3,800 16,280 2,560 3,570 22,410 22,410 (7,270) 
Synthetic Gas • • • . • 
Total · ..... · 13,825 35,090 25,220 74,135 2,560 3,570 80,265 
1980 Household & Commercial 300 7,720 9,480 17,500 17,500 320 17,820 6,040 23,860 
Industrial . . . • . . . 4,750 7,590 12,500 24,840 24,840 380 25,220 4,170 29,390 
Transportation. . . . . 21,440 1,400 22,840 22,840 22,840 30 22,870 
Electrical Generation . • 10,660 5,000 3,600 19,260 6,720 3,990 29,970 29,970 (10,240) 
Synthetic Gas . • . . . 430 440 870 870 (700) 
Total · ..... • 16,140 42,190 26,980 85,310 6,720 3,990 96,020 
1985 Household & Commercial 100 8,800 10,060 18,960 18,960 940 19,900 7,800 27,700 
Industrial . • . • • . • 5,150 9,130 13,240 27,520 27,520 1,060 28,580 6,290 34,870 
Transportation .... 25,450 1,640 27,090 27,090 27,090 40 27,130 
Electrical Generation . 14,220 6,650 3,450 24,320 11,750 4,320 40,390 40,390 (14,130) 
Synthetic Gas 2,000 670 2,670 2,670 (2,000) 
Total · ..... • 21,470 50,700 28,390 100,561) 11,750 4,320 116,630 
N 
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TABLE X 
ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY SOURCES AND SECTORS, 1971-2000. 
Total Total Total 
Total Gross Synthetic Four utility Three 
b Natural Fossil Nuclear Hydro c Energy Gas Sector Electric Sector 
Coala Petroleum Gas Fuels Power Power Inputs Distributed Inputs Distributed Inputs 
2000 Household & Commercial 11,120 10,800 21,920 21,920 2,640 24,560 15,070 39,630 
Industrial • . . • . • . 6,700 14,660 17,940 39,300 39,300 2,850 42,160 15,620 57,780 
Transportation .... 40,010 2,600 42,610 42,610 42,610 50 42,660 
Electrical Generation . 17,520 5,040 2,640 25,200 49,230 5,950 80,380 80,380 (30,740) 
Synthetic Gas . . . . . 7,140 550 7,690 7,690 (5,500) 
Total ••••••... 31,360 71,380 33,980 136,720 49,230 5,950 191,900 
aIncludes anthracite, bituminous, and lignite. 
bpetroleum products refined and processed from crude oil, including still gas, and natural gas liquids. 
cThe hydropower input energy levels in this table are arbitrarily calculated from output energy data assuming the same conversion efficiency as associated 
with fossil fuels (approximately 32%). Actually hydropower conversion efficiencies are about 90%--thus, for comparison with hydropower input energy 
figures elsewhere in this report, (which have been calculated from output numbers using the correct efficiency) one must divide the numbers in this 
column by 2.8. 
Source: Maryland /48/, p. 42. 
TABLE XI 
WORLD ENERGY DEMAND THROUGH 2000 
Nation 1970 
(actual) 
1980 
(proj ec ted) 
1990 
(projected) 
(Quadrillion BTU per year) 
United states 68 103 145 
Western Europe 47 72 116 
Japan 12 24 52 
Communist Countries 55 105 168 
Rest of World 30 58 94 
Total 212 362 575 
Source: Maryland/48/, p. 52. 
ENERGY AND AGRICULTURE 
A. Energy Use in Agriculture 
2000 
(proj ec ted) 
192 
171 
86 
240 
171 
860 
We recall from Part II that three to four percent of U. S. energy consump-
tion is consumed by production agriculture. About 45 percent of that is used 
directly on farms, to power tractors, trucks, and other machinery and to operate 
irrigation, drying and heating systems. The remaining 55 percent of the energy 
used in production agriculture is consumed in the form of chemical fertilizer and 
other farm supplies which were produced in other sectors. 
When one includes energy use for the transportation, processing, retailing 
and preparation of agricultural commodities the energy consumption of the U.S. 
food sys tern measures 12 to 13 percent of total U. S. energy consumption. The 
total food economy is thus an important consumer of energy. 57 
Energy is likewise a crucial input into agriculture. Total estimated farm 
expenditure in 1972 was $47 billion, of which energy-related expenses comprised 
$8.4 billion: $2.5 billion for fertilizer, $1. 9 billion for liquid fuels, $1.1 billion 
for tractors and $2.9 billion for other machinery and equipment. 58 
In 1939 American agriculture used, on the average, less than one-tenth of 
one gallon of liquid fuel per man-hour of labor. By 1950 it had grown to about 
four-tenths gallon per man-hour. And by 1972 more than one gallon of liquid 
fuel was consumed per man-hour of labor. 59 As we would expect from any normally-
shaped60 transformation curve, farm output per gallon of fuel declined during 
this period by half. The prices of labor and land were both rising relative to · the 
price of fuel; labor input fell by 70 percent and land use declined by 40 million 
acres. 61 (See Table XII) The tremendous increases in output per unit of labor which 
have been enjoyed by agriculture have been due largely to the substirution 
of energy for human labor and plant nutrients. 62 . 
It is instructive to introduce the concept of energy efficiency, a comparison 
of the energy content of the inputs with the energy content of the output of a 
process. 63 The energy efficiency of production agriculture is better than that of most 
sectors of the economy. All of farming consumes about 1.2 kilocalories of energy 
to produce 1 kcal. Grain production enjoys an average energy efficiency of more 
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TABLE XII 
INDEX OF QUANTITES AND PRICES OF 
SELECTED FARM INPUTS 
Power & Fuel ' Fertilizer 
Year Labor Machinery & oil & lime 
Quantities 
1950 100 100 100 100 
" 
1955 85 115 116 141 
1960 67 115 119 169 
1965 55 122 125 250 
1970 45 129 129 353 
1972 44 130 131 383 
1973 45 130 388 
Prices 
1950 100 100 NA 100 
1955 121 113 NA i08 
1960 148 138 100
1 106 
1965 171 154 105 106 
1970 255 194 112 103 
1972 278 218 116 109 
1974 328 257 2 124 
1 1960 used as a base 
2 For movement of price s of energy inputs, See Figure 3 
Source: ERS, USDA. 
than two to one, but the energy efficiency of cattle feeding is about 0.2 to 1, no 
better than the efficiency of a 1974 automobile. 64 And the energy efficiency of 
the entire food economy (production agriculture plus its manufactured inputs, 
processing, distribution, retailiag and use) has been estimated to be less than 0.2 
to one,65 as we sacrifice energy efficiency for greater convenience, variety and 
value. We shall examine in greater detail, below, the case of corn, energy use therein 
and its relatively high energy efficiency. 
Brief mention was made of the large annual expenditure on chemical fertilizer. 
A large portion of that expenditure is for nitrogen; one characteristic of recent 
changes in U.S. agriculture which our energy resources have made possible is the 
shift from a land-extensive technology using nitrogen-fixing legumes in rotation 
to a land-intensive and energy-intensive technology using chemical fertilizers to 
replenish the soil's nitrogen. A measure of the energy-intensity of this newer 
technology is the fact that 90 percent of the anhydrous ammonia used on U.S. farms 
as a source of nitrogen has natural gas as a basic feedstock. 66 
Just as in the economy as a whole aggregate figures do not tell the whole 
story, so in agriculture total annual consumption is ' only part of the picture, for 
agriculture experiences wide fluctuations in seasonal demand for energy. Obvious 
peaks in demand occur during planting and harvesting periods, when huge 
quantities of fuel are burned in large tractors and other machinery. Huge quantities 
of energy are also required at harvest time to dry grain67 and during peak parts 
of the winter to provide warmth to feed and livestock. Even if there were no aggregate 
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potential energy supply problem in agriculture, the peak seasonal needs and con-
sequent distributional requirements (and bottlenecks, as it works out) demand atten-
tion. 
Related to the seasonality of demand for energy in agriculture is the issue of 
substitution among energy sources. Although farmers can and do substitute diesel 
fuel for gasoline in much of their new equipment, such substitutions involve 
major capi tal expense in the form of new engines designed to burn the other fuel. 
But just as many of the agricultural activities must be done between certain 
times, so many must be performed in certain places, often in the fields . Those 
activities are poorly suited to a fixed-site energy source such as electricity; 
agriculture will continue to need fossil fuels or some alternative portable energy 
source to power its many mobile engines. Agriculturalists will probably also 
continue to prefer clean-burning natural gas for grain dryers to dirtier alternatives 
such as coal. This is not the deny the possiblity of substitutions, for marginal 
substitutions among similar energy sources occur nearly all the time. But it is to 
suggest that the technology of u.s. farming is integrally linked to, in fact includes 
and demands, certain patterns of energy resource use which can be changed only if the 
entire system also changes. 
B. Energy and Corn Production: A Case Study 
We have thus far spoken in rather general terms about agriculture. With the 
aid of Tables XIII and XIV we can now examine the particular case of corn produc-
tion as representative of foodgrain production in U.S. agriculture. This special case 
will highlight much of what has already been said. We take out data from a study by 
Pimentel and his colleagues at Cornell U niversi ty .68 The reader is referred to their 
study for further details. 
From 1945 to 1970 average corn yields per acre increased 140 percent, from 
34 bushels to 81 bushels. Forty percent or so of this increase has been attributed to 
the use of the new hybrid varieties, but the other 60 percent is due to new or 
increased energy resource inputs. 69 While labor input into corn production declined 
by 60 percent, direct fuel consumption rose 47 percent from 15 to 22 gallonsl 
per acre and nitrogen use grew 1600 percent from seven to 112 pounds per acre. By 
1970 nitrogen had become the largest single energy input into corn production at 
940,800 kilocalories per acre, an energy input depending almost entirely on natural 
gas. 
Another activity heavily dependent upon natural gas, and for which substitu-
tion would be difficult, is grain drying, which increased twelve-fold from 1945 to 1970. 
Table XIV allows us to examine changes in the energy efficiency of corn 
production between 1945 and 1970. While corn yields increased 140 percent, mean 
energy inputs increased 210 percent, from 0.9 million kcal per acre to 2.9 million. 
Thus the yield in corn calories decreased from 3.7 calories per one fuel input 
calorie in 1945 to a yield of 2.8 calories per fuel input calorie in 1970.70 We should 
note for perspective that, compared with the nearly three million kilocalories of 
energy inputs supplied to each acre of corn by the farm, the sun provides a phenomenal 
2043 million kilocalories of energy. Only 1.26 percent of this, on the average, is 
converted into the corn plant; the yield of the grain itself, 8. 17 million 
kilocalories, is less than 0.4 percent of the total solar energy falling on the field 
during the growing season. 71 
The Pimentel study is but one of several which have estimated foodstuff 
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TABLE XIII 
. AVERAGE ENERGY INPUTS IN CORN PRODUCTION 
(FIGURES PER ACRE) 
Inputs 1945 1950 1954 1959 1964 1970 
Labor (hours) 3 23 18 17 14 11 9 
Machinery (kcal x 10 ) 180 250 300 350 420 420 
Gasoline (gallons) 15 17 19 20 21 22 
Nitrogen (pounds) 7 15 27 41 58 112 
Phosphorus (pounds) 7 10 12 16 18 31 
Potassium (pounds) 5 10 18 30 29 60 
VJ Seeds (bushels) 3 0.17 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.33 0.33 I--' 
Irrigation (kcal x 10 ) 19 23 27 31 34 34 
Insecticides (pounds) 0 0.1 0.3 0.7 1 1 
Herbicides (poun?f) 0 0.005 0.10 0.25 0.38 1 
Drying (kcal x 10) 3 10 30 60 100 120 120 
Electricity (kcal x 10) 3 32 54 100 140 203 310 
Transportation (kcal x 10 ) 20 30 45 60 70 70 
Corn Yields (bushel) 34 38 41 54 68 81 
Source: Pimentel et al. /55/, Table 1, p. 444. 
TABLE XIV 
ENERGY INPUTS 1N CORN PRODUCTION, 1945 & 1970 
(KILOCALORIES PER ACRE) 
Input 1945 
Labor 12,500 
Machinery 180,000 
Ga-soline 543,400 
Nitrogen 58,800 
Phosphorus 10,600 
Potassium 5,200 
Seeds for Planting 34,000 
Irrigation 19,000 
Insecticides 0 
Herbicides 0 
Drying 10,000 
Electricity 32,000 
Transportation 20,000 
Total inputs 925,500 
Corn yield (outputs) 3,427,200 
kcal return/input kcal 3.70 
Source: Pimentel et al. /55/, Table 2, p. 445. 
1970 
4,900 
420,000 
797,000 
940,800 
47,100 
68,000 
63,000 
34,000 
11,000 
11,000 
120,000 
310,000 
70,000 
2,896,800 
8,164,800 
2.82 
production energy efficiencies. The estimates have ranged from 6: 1 to 1:6 for 
energy intensive agriculture. 72 (See Table XV.) Obviously, it is difficult to compare 
the coefficients for barley (6.6: 1) and frozen broccoli (0.13: 1) because the former must 
normally be fed to livestock and then processed and made ready for the consumer 
while the latter is ready for final home preparation. So, energy efficiency is but an 
intermediate end in a complex ends-means scheme. We are concerned with the 
energy efficiency of agricultural commodities because they are a part of a larger 
whole. 
C. Effects and Adjustments 
Recent changes in the energy regime will of necessity elicit a number of 
adjustments and changes in the agricultural sector of our economy. The effects will 
be felt on both the supply and demand side of the market. We can not predict 
the details of the final equilibrium; our discussion of the nature and direction of 
the likely adjustments will rather be suggestive and illustrative. 
Carter and Youde argue that the result of the so-called energy crisis will be 
primarily a price adjustment, rather than a supply adjustment. To the extent that 
price increases for petroeum products worldwide create balance of payments 
difficulties and a deceleration of economic growth in food importing nations, 
Carter and Youde predict a decline" in foreign demand for U.S. agricultural products 
and a shift in demand away from commodities with high income elasticities of 
demand (such as meat, fruits and vegetables) toward commodities (such as cereals 
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TABLE XV 
ENERGY OUTPUT-INPUT RATIOS FOR SELECTED 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 
Commodity 
Barley 
Corn (including drying) 
Potatoes (raw) 
Apples (raw) 
Beans, Green (canned) 
Broccoli (frozen) 
Paddy rice, Philippines 
Corn grain, U. S. 
Soybeans, U. S. 
Peanuts, U. S. 
Rice, U. S. 
Potatoes, U. S. 
Wet rice culture, Far East 
Intensive rice 
Intensive potatoes 
Range fed beef 
Sources: /14, 32, 71/. 
Cervinka 
Heichel 
steinhart 
and coarse grains) with rather low income elasticities of demand. 73 
Ratio 
6.6 
2.3 
2.1 
1.2 
.29 
.13 
16.0 
4.2 
2.5 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
20.0 
7.0 
3.0 
2.0 
Possibilities for substitution among energy inputs in production have already 
been mentioned: diesel for gasoline machinery is a familiar example. Many more 
possibilities exist, on which work progresses: one example is the use of solar energy 
to dry grain. Not only substitution among energy inputs, but also substitution of 
other inputs for energy, is potentially important,74 especially in light of the tremendous 
increases in energy prices paid by farmers since 1973. (See figure 3.) One of the 
most intriguing possibilities is the substitution of nitrogen-fixing bacteria for 
nitrogen fertilizer derived from natural gas. 75 If the efforts to develop strains of grass 
and grain crops which accept nitrogen-fixing bacteria are successful, a large amount of 
natural gas could be conserved and yields would likely increase. 
One can consider improved technology an important substitute for energy, as it 
can make possible the production of a unit of agricultural output with less energy 
input. 76 Examples of significant technological developments are plant spacing to 
optimize the conversion of solar energy, the introduction of high lysine corn, 
numerous minimum tillage practices, feeding single-cell protein which can be manu-
factured from petroleum waste, and increased grazing of livestock. 77 
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In addition to energy substitution responses on the supply side, it is possible 
greatly to increase the energy efficiency of familiar agricultural practices. The higher 
prices and tighter availability of energy sources are strong incentives for farmers to 
embrace such opportunities. Often the energy efficiency could be increased by simple 
capital improvements, such as insulating heated buildings, or modifying the farm 
layout. As mentioned above, the transportation system affords great opportunities 
for an improvement in energy efficiency whenever it is possible to use railroads 
or barges instead of trucks or aircraft. 
Finally, the development of energy alternatives to fossil fuels from agricultural 
products grown in an "energy plantation" is an interesting possibility. Among the 
suggestions are that cellulose crops be grown which can be burned to provide 
energy,18 and that alcohol be produced by fermentation from a number of crops79 
or from animal wastes. so Given the world food situation, the present levels of food 
and energy prices, and current technology it is not at all clear that the use of 
cereals for alcohol production, and of arable land for an energy plantation, is 
defensible. But it is clear that further research in this area is important. s1 
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This reflects the increased popularity of diesel-powered tractors and combines, 
favored for their economy. USDA figures indicate that the proportion of new 
tractors powered by diesel engines has grown from about 50% in 1964 to 
nearly 90% in 1973; the shift to diesel-powered combines has lagged behind 
the shift to tractors but has greatly accelerated in recent months as the 
cost of fuel has increased. 
60That is, exhibiting a diminshing marginal rate of transformation. 
61Gavett (26). 
62Griliches (29) and others estimate that between 60 and 80 percent of the increased 
corn yields since 1940 is due to energy resource inputs with hybrid seed 
accounting for nearly all the remainder. See our discussion of corn and energy 
below, pp. 30-32. 
63Both economists and farmers are skilled in the computation of economic efficiency, 
and given the formerly prevailing low energy input prices the familiar resource 
use patterns were economically efficient. As prices rise, patterns of resource 
use will be adjusted to maintain economic efficiency. No one-dimensional 
evaluation is adequate, though, neither economic efficiency nor energy 
efficiency. Energy efficiency is a 1:lseful additional criterion by which to evalute 
alternatives. Timmer (73) argues that too much attention has been focused on 
energy efficiency in recent months, while "the criterion is economic" still. 
64Schneeberger (65), p. 6. The total U.S. transportation system operates with an 
energy efficiency of 0.17 to 1, and the most efficient electrical generating 
facilities do not exceed an efficiency of 0.4 to l. 
65Schneeberger (65). 
66Gavett (26). He reports that 86 plants in the United States currently produce NH3 
by means of the Haber-Bosch process. In this process H2 is extracted from 
natural gas and then combined with N 2 under high temperature and pressure. 
Alternative technologies are estimated by the TVA to cost more than three 
times as much as the Haber-Bosch process, given current relative prices. See 
Schneeberger and Breimyer (66), p. 4. Natural gas is consumed directly on 
farms in large quantities. For example, "40% of all the natural gas sold by 
Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. in Nebraska goes directly to irrigation 
pumping," Center for Rural Affairs (13), p. l. 
67The new hybrids generally have longer growing seasons so are picked later in the 
year with higher moisture content. 
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68Pimentel et al. (55). 
690f course, this is not to say that one could remove all the energy resource 
inputs and continue to produce at 20% greater than 1945 levels, on the strength 
of the hybrids alone, for they require massive inputs of (energy-intensive) 
nitrogen fertilizer and other complementary inputs to grow. 
70 Again we repeat that energy efficiency is not everything, nor is the caloric content 
of our food grains the only important output parameter. But it is of major 
importance. 
71 Heichel (31), noting that corn captures only one percent of the energy falling on 
it from the sun, estimates that the theoretical maximum is twelve percent. This 
could be a fruitful and extraordinarily valuable area for research. 
72Derived from Cervinka (14), Heichel (32), and Steinhart and Steinhart (71). 
73Carter and Youde (11). 
74Recall that the reason for the phenomenal growth of energy use in agriculture 
was its massive substitution for other, more economically scarce, inputs, especially 
labor and land. With new relative prices among the inputs, other substitutions 
may become economic. 
75See Marx (47), who reviews research in which a number of nitrogen-fixing 
bacteria have been found to develop symbiotic relationships with various grasses 
and grains. The importance of this discovery is that grasses and grains are much 
more efficient photosynthesizers than are legumes, the hosts of the previously-
known nitrogen-fixing bacteria. 
760r, of course, the production of more output from the same energy input. 
77See , for instance, Gavett (26). 
78It is estimated that twenty tons of dry matter is the probable maximum yield per 
acre, and that each ton would release 15 million BTU's. See Prairie Farmer, 
18 August 1973. 
79See Miller (49), and Gavett (26). Potatoes and many grains are suitable sources of 
alcohol; typical yields are 2.6 gallons of 2000 proof alcohol per bushel of grain. 
80See, for instance, Gavett (26). 
81See Business Week (8). 
39 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. The Association of the Bat of the City of New York, Special Committee on Electric 
Power and the Environment, Electricity and the Environment (New York: West, 
1973). 
2. Barnes, Kenneth K., "Energy and Agriculture," paper presented to the Annual 
Meeting of American Society of Agricultural Engineers, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
23-26 June 1974. 
3. Berg, Charles A., "Energy Conservation Through Effective Utilization," Science, 
vol. 181, 13 July 1973, pp. 128-138. 
4. Blairstein, Bernard, Research Chemist, Bureau of Mines, in an address to the 
Environmental Insti tute for College Faculty, 31 July 1973, reported in the Columbia 
Missourian, 1 August 1973, p. 5. 
5. Boulding, K. E., "The Social System and the Energy Crisis," Science, vol. 184, 19 
April 1974,255-257. 
6. Business Week, 21 April 1973. 
7. Business Week, 30 June 1973, "The Scramble for Resources." 
8. Business Week, 16 June 1975, "Research to Multiply Food Production: Was Malthus 
Right?", pp. 64-66, 70, 72. 
9. Calhoun, J. c., Jr., and R. L. Whiting, "Prognosis for Expanded U. S. Production 
of Crude Oil," Science, vol. 184, 19 April 1974, pp. 331-336. 
10. Calvin, Melvin, "Solar Energy by Photosynthesis," Science, vol. 184, 19 April 1974, 
pp. 375-381. 
11. Carter, Harold 0., and James G. Youde, "Some Impacts of the Changing Energy 
Situation on U. S. Agriculture," AmericanJournal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 56, 
no. 5, December 1974, pp. 878-887. 
12. Casey, J. E., R. D. Lacewell and L. L. Jones, "Impact of Fuel Shortages on 
Agricultural Output - Southern High Plains of Texas," paper presented at annual 
meeting of Western Agricultural Economics Association, Moscow, Idaho, 24-26 
July 1974. 
13. Center for Rural Affairs Newsletter, Walthill, Nebraska (no date). 
14. Cervinka, V., et. aI, Energy Requirements for Agriculture in California , California 
Dept. of Food and Agriculture and U niversi ty of California, Davis, January 1974. 
15. Coffman, Bob, "Dry Soybeans for Top Dollar," FarmJournal, August 1973, p. 24. 
16. Columbia Missourian, 19 June 1975, p. l. 
17. Columbia Missourian, 20 June 1975, "U. S. Cuts Estimates of Offshore Oil," p. l. 
18. Committee on Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives , "Oil Imports 
and Energy Security: An Analysis of the Current Situation and Future Prospects." 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Domestic and International Monetary 
Effect of Energy and Other Natural Resource Pricing, 93d Congress, 2d Session, 
Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, September 1974. 
19. Committee on Resources and Man, National Academy of Sciences-National 
Research Council, Resources and Man, (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 
1969). 
20. Conlan, D. R. "We Still Need a Cost of Living Council," Challenge, vol. 17, 
July-August 1974, pp. 8-14. 
21. Darmstadter, Joel, with Perry D. Tietelbaum and Jaroslav G. Polech, Energy in the 
World Economy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 
Inc., 1971). 
22. Dunham, J. T., C. Rampacek and T. A. Henrie, "High-Sulphur Coal for 
40 
Generating Electricity," Science, vol. 184, 19 April 1974, pp. 346-351. 
23. Dye, Lee, "Mismanagement of Radioactive Wastes Threatens U. S." (Headline of an 
article in Colttmbia Tribune, Columbia, Missouri, Thursday, 5 July 1973, p. 1; 
copyright 1973, Los Angeles Times). 
24. Edison Electric Institute, "Fuels for the Electric Utility Industry, 1971-1985". (No 
date.) 
25. Fabricant, N. and R. Hallman, Toward a Rational Power Policy (Bregiller, 1971). 
26. Gavett, Earle E., "Agriculture and the Energy Crisis," paper presented to the 
National Conference on Agriculture and the Energy Crisis, University of Nebraska, 
10-11 April 1973. 
27. Geological Survey, U. S. Department of the Interior, Geological Survey Professional 
Paper Number 820, (Washington, D.C., May 1973). 
28. Gillett, Robert, "Oil and Gas Resources: Did USGS Gush Too High?", Science, vol. 
185, 12 July 1974, pp. 127-130. 
29. Griliches, Zvi, "Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological 
Change," Econometrica, vol. 25, 1957, pp. 501-522. 
30. Hammond, A. L., "A Timetable for Expanded Energy Availability," Science, vol. 
184, 19 April 1974, pp. 367-369. 
31. Heichel, G. H., Comparative Efficiency of Energy Use in Crop Production, Connecticut 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 739, November 1973. 
32. Heichel, Gary H., "Auxiliary Energy Requirements and Food Energy Yields of 
Selected Food Crops," paper presented to AAAS Symposium on Energy and 
Agriculture, San Francisco, California, February 1974. 
33. Hirst, E., Energy Consumption for Transportation in the U. S. (Report ORNL-NSF-
EP-15, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn~see, 1973). 
34. Holden, Constance, "Energy: Shortages Loom but Conservation Lags," Science, vol. 
180, 15 June 1973, pp. 1155-1158. 
35. Hubbert, Marion King, Energy Resoltrces, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of 
Sciences-National Research Council, Publication lOO-D, 1962). 
36. Jacobson, 1. c., "Discovered but Unproved Gas Reserves," Natural Resources 
Journal, vol. 12, no. 3, July 1972, pp. 413-416. 
37. Joint Economic Committee, "Energy Statistics," Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Priori'ties and Economy in Government, 93d Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions, 14 
and 21 January 1974, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1974. 
38. Kaplan, Irving E., "Some Politics of Fusion Research," Center Report, vol. 6, no. 3, 
August 1973, pp. 11-12. 
39. Kottman, Dean Roy M., private letter to Michael Perelman, 14 May 1973; data 
from the office's publication "Patterns of Energy Consumption in the United 
States," Washington, D.C., January 1972. 
40. Lapp, Ralph E., "We're Running Out of Gas," New York Times Magazine, 19 March 
1972. 
41. Lewis, Robert G., Poor Countries (sic) Use o/Political Muscle May Lead to World Boom 
in Farm Prices, Farmers Union News Release, 28 May 1975. 
42. Limaye, Dillip R., and John R. Sharko, "U. S. Energy Policy Evaluation: Some 
Analytical Approaches," Energy Policy, March 1974. 
43. Lincoln, G. A., "Energy Conservation," Science, vol. 180, 13 April 1973, pp. 
155-180. 
44. MacAvoy, P., "The Regulation-Induced Shortage of Natural Gas, "Jottrnal of Law 
and Economics, April 1971. 
45. McKelvey, V. E., "Mineral Resource Estimates and Public Policy," in United States 
41 
Mineral Resources, D. A. Brobst and W. P. Pratt (eds.), U. S. Geological Survey 
Professional Paper 820, Washington, D.C., 1973. 
46. McKinsey, James W., Jr., and Kenneth C. Schneeberger, "An Assessment of the 
Energy Resource Situation-Prospectus for Agriculture", Agricultural Economics 
Paper # 1974-40, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Missouri-
Columbia, Columbia, Missouri, 1974. 
47. Marx,JeanL., "Nitrogen Fixation," Science, vol. 185, 12July 1974,pp. 132-136. 
48. State of Maryland, Energy Committee of the Governor's Science Advisory Council, 
The Energy Problem and Maryland, September 1973. 
49. Miller, Dwight L., "United States Energy From Agriculture," paper presented to 
the National Conference on Agriculture and the Energy Crisis, Lincoln, Nebraska, 
10-11 April 1973. 
50. Murry, J. R., et. aI., "Evaluation of Public Response to the Energy Crises," Science, 
vol. 184, 19 April 1974, pp. 257-263. 
51. National Economic Research Associates, Energy Consumption and Gross National 
Product in the U. S., (Washington, D.C., 1971). 
52. National Grain and Feed Association, "The Energy Crisis and You!" (Washington, 
D.C., June 1973). 
53. Newsweek, 22 January 1973, "America's Energy Crisis," pp. 52-54 and 59-60. 
54. Noland, Michael C. , "Energy-The Choices to be Made," MRI Qttarterly, Spring, 
1974, (Kansas City: Midwest Research Institute). 
55. Pimentel, David, et. aI., "Food Production and the Energy Crisis," Science, vol. 
182, 2 November 1973, pp. 443-449. 
56. Price, D. R., "The Energy Dilemma, An Analysis of the Current Situation," 
Department of Agricultural Engineering, Cornell University, August 1973. 
57. The Review of Economic Studies Symposium on the Economics 0/ Renewable Resources, 
Geoffrey M. Head, editor, 1974. 
58. Risser, Hubert E., "Energy Supply Problems for the 1970s and Beyond," 
Environmental Geology Notes, No. 62, Illinois State Geological Survey, May 
1973. 
59. Risser, Hubert E., "The U. S. Energy Dilemma: The Gap Between Today's 
Requirements and Tomorrow's Potential," Environmental Geology Notes, No. 64, 
Illinois State Geological Survey, July 1973. 
60. Robert, Marc, "Is There an Energy Crisis?", The Public Interest, vol. 31, Spring 
1973. 
61. Robson, Geoffrey, "Geothermal Electricity Production," Science. vol. 184, 19 April 
1974, pp. 371-375. 
62. Rocks, Lawrence and Richard P. Runyon, The Energy Crisis (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 1972). 
63. Rose, David]., "Energy Policy in the U. S.," Scientific American, vol. 230, no. 1, 
January 1974, pp. 20-29. 
64. Rose, David J., "Nuclear Electric Power," Science, vol. 184, 19 April 1974, pp. 
351-360. 
65. Schneeberger, Kenneth c., "70 Quadrillion BTU's-and Climbing", Agricultural 
Economics Paper # 1974-2, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of 
Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, Missouri 1974. 
66. Schneeberger, Kenneth C. and Harold F. Breimyer, "Agriculture in an Energy 
Hungry World," paper presented to the annual meeting of the Southern 
Agricultural Economics Association, Memphis, Tennessee, 5 February 1974. 
67. Schneeberger, Kenneth C. and Harold F. Breimyer, "The Energy Shortage and 
42 
Agriculture, "Journal of the American Society ofF arm Managers and Rural Appraisers, 
vo. 38, no. 1, April 1974. 
68. Schurr, Sam H., Bruce C. Betschert, et. al., energy in the American Economy, 
1850-1975 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, Inc., 
1960). 
60. Searl, Milton F., andJoel Darmstadter, "Propsects for Energy Supply," Resources/or 
the Future, Washington, D.C., August 1973. 
70. Squires, A. M., "Clean Fuels from Coal Gassification," Science, vol. 184, 19 April 
1974, pp. 340-346. 
71. Steinhart, John S. and Carol E. Steinhart, "Energy Use in the U. S. Food System," 
Science, vol. 184, 19 April 1974, pp. 307-316. 
72. Theobald, P. K., S. P. Schweinfurthand D. C. Duncan, Energy Resourceso/the United 
States, U. S. Geological Survey Circular 650, Washington, D.C., 1972. 
73. Timmer, C. Peter, "Interaction of Energy and Food Prices in Less Developed 
Countries", American Journal of Agricultural Economics, vol. 57, no. 2, May 1975, 
pp. 219-224. 
74. U. S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstraa of the United States: 1974 (75th 
Edition), Washington, D.C., July 1974. 
75. United State Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Farm Cost 
Situation, FCS-43, February 1972. 
76. U. S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1960. 
77. United States Government, Council on Environmental Quality, "Energy and the 
Environment," Washington, D.C., 14 August 1973. 
78. Walsh, J., "Problems of Expanding Coal Production," Science, vol. 184, 19 April 
1974, pp. 336-340. 
79. Whittlesey, Norman K., and Walter R. Butcher, "Energy Research Opportunities 
for Agricultural Economists", American Journal 0/ Agricultural Economics, vol. 57, 
no. 5, December 1974, pp. 896-903. 
80. Wolf, Martin, "Solar Energy Utilization by Physical Methods," Science, vol. 184, 
19 April 1974, pp. 382-386. 
81. Young, Raymond, Executive Vice President of MFA Oil Company, statement 
reported in the Columbia Missourian, Columbia, Missouri, 19 August 1973, p. 3. 
43 
